The logic of deterrence as one of the solutions and control systems to prevent war has been challenged by the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, coercion means trying to influence another's behavior by using force or threat of force. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a means of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? The main goal of this research is to achieve a theoretical model in the form of a theoretical model in order to analyze the variables and finally understand the important role of tactical nuclear weapons in contemporary international politics. The research method is descriptive and analytical and corresponds to two steps; In the first step, an attempt is made to examine a theoretical model called the state of structural complexity, which is considered a kind of theoretical arrangement by the author, in order to study the cross-sectional state of the international order (after the Cold War until now) and in The second step related to analysis, relationship and correlation between variables should be examined. According to the research hypothesis, statistics and current trends, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments as an efficient tool for applying coercion without possibility they are considered mutual assured destruction.IntroductionAfter the end of the Cold War, the international system was placed in a state of structural complexity due to variables such as the unipolar structure of the international system, the development of technology, and the development of the international system. According to these changes in the international system, we are witnessing a change in the control system of nuclear deterrence due to the Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a tool of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? According to the hypothesis of this research, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments are considered as an efficient tool to apply coercion without the possibility of mutual assured destruction.

Most empirical studies of the effects of nuclear weapons only consider whether a state at a given time has nuclear arms or not, but there are strong reasons to think that the effects of a state’ s nuclear arsenal are conditioned by a range of other variables including how nuclear weapons are managed. I argue that the effect of nuclear weapons in non-existential disputes is determined by what I call nuclear risk: the overall likelihood that these weapons may be used without authorization by political leaders. Using a formal model, I hypothesize that higher nuclear risk leads to greater deterrent power, but it also makes the leaders of the nuclear state more cautious if their deterrence fails. I test these two hypotheses using the Correlates of War data. I first measure nuclear risk using a simple index, and then propose a novel Bayesian technique for imputing risk. Both hypotheses are borne out by empirical results.

Despite economic entanglements and numerous international disputes, Russia has not abandoned its goal of creating a strategic deterrence against the United States over the past decade. As the result of its efforts, Russia today has access to ultra-supersonic advanced strategic weapons and projectiles that distinguish it from other nuclear powers worldwide. The objectives pursued by this paper are to examine the dimensions and characteristics of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy, the reasons for adopted this strategy and its consequences for Russia's relations with Europe and the United States. Accordingly, the present paper seeks to provide appropriate answers for the following questions: "What is the most prominent feature of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy? ” and “ What are its implications for the troika of Russia-EU-US relations? " The author argues that "The ability to pose a direct threat to the United States, rather than a proxy threat to Europe, is the most prominent feature of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy that may lead to the proximity of Russia to the European Union and deepening the rift on both sides of the Atlantic. A qualitative method and descriptive-explanatory methodology is employed in this paper and its theoretical foundation is laid on the deterrence (nuclear) theory.

By the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons were introduced as a deterrent to war and inhibitors. To achieve such technological has been cause of developments force and to ensure for security policies states. In this regard, Iran is also considering the actual experience of Iraq war and increasing threats to regional and also part of the great powers and how their stance against the Iran’s regime has tried to become a nuclear power technology. The knowledge acquired by Iran’s peaceful nuclear and predict future other success, it plays an important role in changing the balance of power in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East has its benefits .Of course neorealism as the dominant paradigm in International Relations and in the international system is specific definition of safety and security threats. Thus, this particular definition, nuclear deterrence is a special place in this approach. Therefore, it is essential to understand that how nuclear technology provided to Iran security guarantees and it improves stability and national security.

The expansion of anti-missile system of the United States has led to several reactions from other international actors. Some of the Western countries especially the United States’ allies consider the deployment of these systems as providing their security and the stability of international system. On the other hand countries like China and in particular Russia consider these systems as a destabilizing factor for international security and disrupting the nuclear deterrence and therefore a threat to their security. The present descriptive analytical paper examines the relations between the United States anti-missile system and nuclear deterrence. For this reason it defines the concept and the characteristic of nuclear deterrence strategy and missile defense system and then examines the relation of these two concepts before the Cold War and after of the end of Cold War. The finding is that during the Cold War the anti-missile system were in the direction of stabilizing balance of power, therefore, it led to stability but after the end of Cold War, though in the face of it is defensive but in reality it is offensive and it ignores the balancing strategy and it is in the direction of military-nuclear superiority.

Operation Waʿd Ṣādiq (1 & 2), conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Zionist regime, occurred for the first time in the past 50 years. This attack holds historical significance and is unprecedented since World War II. The importance of this operation and assault becomes evident when evaluated through the lens of the theory of nuclear deterrence, according to which a nuclear-armed state is considered immune from direct attacks. By launching a direct strike against the Zionist regime, Iran has challenged the credibility of this regime’s nuclear deterrence. While over the past year, the deterrent credibility of the regime has already been tested by resistance groups—such as Operation Ṭūfān al-Aqṣā, the missile and drone attacks by Ḥizb Allāh, as well as drone offensives by Anṣār Allāh of Yemen and the Iraqi resistance—Operation Waʿd Ṣādiq is distinguished by the fact that it was executed by a regional power possessing an independent nation-state structure. As such, it has subjected the theory of deterrence to a serious challenge. This study, using a descriptive-analytical methodology, concludes that due to the Islamic Republic’s entry into direct conflict with the Zionist regime, Iran must now reinforce its own deterrence capabilities and pay special attention to its internal challenges. Thus, in the new paradigm of warfare, the ultimate victor is the actor who succeeds in hybrid warfare and manages to rally public opinion and strengthen popular support. Therefore, alongside the enhancement of military power, missile range, and even a possible revision of nuclear policy, the Islamic Republic must increase its power in areas such as the economy, scientific advancement, domestic production, media, diplomacy, and more broadly, its resilience. Accordingly, the future of power belongs to the actor that can establish integrated and hybrid deterrence.

The management of the conflict and the absence of a full-scale war between the two hostile countries of South Asia, namely India and Pakistan, after 1998 has been due to various factors. Along with various factors such as the evolution in India's foreign policy and the change in the structure of the international system from bipolar to multipolar, the role of nuclear deterrence between the two countries should be examined in particular. The question we seek to answer in this study is what the prospects for escalating tensions between India and Pakistan will be in the future? What has been tested in this study is that the balance of power created between India and Pakistan in the nuclear field, just as it has removed the conflicts between these two countries from a state of direct conflict and led them towards the absence of direct and full-scale military war, can follow the same logic in the future. The research findings show that the two countries engaged in violent wars before becoming nuclear, but after becoming nuclear in 1998, the conflicts between the two sides have been managed and limited. Nuclear weapons and the existence of a world with the capability of mutual assured destruction have caused the two countries to consider a rational behavior model in their foreign policy and not engage in full-scale war under the shadow of nuclear deterrence.

According to some analytic bases, a country possessing advanced uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology as well as heavy water technology has achieved “latent nuclear deterrence” because it can build nuclear weapons in short time. Building or not building nuclear weapons depends on the “political will” of that country’s leaders.If the structure of the international system, security environment and the elite threat perceptions change, their decision will also be subject to change.The key goal of this article is to respond to this question: What has been, in the eyes of Iranian decision-makers, the impact of “latent nuclear deterrence” strategy on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran?The research method is “qualitative” and is of “applied” research. It has employed the theory of “neoclassical realism.”Findings of this article show that, in the opinion of Iranian elites and decision-makers, the strategy of “latent nuclear deterrence” has been effective in preventing full-scale military invasion of enemies against Iran and has increased Iran’s bargaining power in the face of Western security demands.This research concludes that, based on Iranian polity’s understanding, this strategy can, under specific circumstances, prevent the full-fledged military invasion of enemy but doesn’t prevent less serious conflicts. It’s a temporary strategy, losing its effectiveness in the long term upon changes in the security environment and elite threat perceptions, thus increasing its chance of failure.

Creating the belief in mutual informational threat up to the point of regret forms the fundamental basis of Intelligence deterrence. Based on this, researchers in this article aim to explain and illustrate a model for this concept. The primary goal of the research is to identify the dimensions and components of the Intelligence deterrence model and to prove three hypotheses, where three main areas: "1- Power and capability, communication, awareness, and credibility as influencing factors; 2- Intelligence capture, Intelligence dominance, Intelligence defense as initial outcomes; 3- Intelligence power and security as the main outcomes of the model" have a direct and positive relationship with Intelligence deterrence. This research, with a descriptive-analytical approach and mixed methodology, was conducted in a community of experts (think tank group) and a specialized community of 50 people, by collecting data from 23 participants. The result of the research is the explanation of the Intelligence deterrence model in two dimensions of "creation and application" (15 components) and identifying the underlying factors and outcomes (8 components).

After the end of the Cold War, a new situation came into existence from the viewpoint of proliferation of nuclear materials, equipment and technical know-how. Till that time the nuclear weapons were in the hands of limited powers. With the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union lost control and supervision on nuclear installations. As a result the possibility of access of governments and non-government actors to nuclear materials and technical know-how increased. The nuclear tests by India, Pakistan and North Korea created new condition from the viewpoint of proliferation in international relations. Meanwhile the countries who possessed nuclear weapons took several measures to fight nuclear proliferation but these activities were within their own interest and they want to prevent other countries to enter the iron club of nuclear powers. Within this framework of policy of limiting other countries access to nuclear weapons one can practically notice that countries like India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel could have access to nuclear weapon. The paper wants to examine that what consequences nuclear proliferation in Asia and Europe (Russia) will be having for this region.